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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
AUTHORITY TO EXPROPRIATE
There were legislative additions to the law of expropriation during the
year which have been dealt with in another symposium.' Reference should
be made to that symposium for comment on the separate statute for
expropriations by municipalities which has been restored after two years
of reliance upon the general expropriation law. Restoration was probably
prompted by the 1974 delegating clause which seemed to eliminate the
need for negotiations prior to resort to expropriation.2 It should also be
noted that, in adopting substantial revisions to the Civil Code articles on
servitudes, the legislature did not disturb its recent codification of the St.
Julien rule which overruled Lake, Inc. v. Louisiana Power and Light Co. 3
In Wood v. Board of Commissioners4 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal held that where title to land is in the state at the time levees are
constructed thereon, a servitude for levee development arises which ne-
gates the need for appropriation or expropriation in the event further
construction work on the levees is necessary after the lands have passed
into private hands.
In State v. Jeanerette Lumber and Shingle Co. 5 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that the issue whether property was taken for a highway
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Session-
Expropriation, 38 LA. L. REV. 115 (1977).
2. LA. R.S. 19:101-115 (Supp. 1977).
3. 330 So. 2d 914 (La. 1976). The Lake decision was overruled in LA. R.S.
19:14 (Supp. 1976). In comment (e) to Louisiana Civil Code article 740 it is noted
that "[t]he modes of acquisition of servitudes under the Civil Code are not exclu-
sive of other modes of acquisition to the same extent as heretofore recognized
under the law. See e.g. Lake v. Louisiana Power & Light Company, 330 So. 2d 914
(La. 1976), and R.S. 19:14." In the Expos6 Des Motifs incorporated in Act 514 of
1977 there is the further comment that under article 740, apparent servitudes may
be acquired by prescription or by destination of the owner, even though they might
have been considered discontinuous under the regime of the 1870 Code and thus
insusceptible of such modes of acquisition.
4. 338 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
5. 350 So. 2d 847 (La. 1977).
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purpose, as distinguished from merely a public purpose, was properly
raised by a timely motion to dismiss. The court also announced that the
issue of the necessity of the taking was properly raised if accompanied by
allegations of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith in determining the
necessity of the taking.6 Thus on judicial review it was held that the taking
of a canal right of way for use in the construction of interstate highway
through the Atchafalya Floodway was for highway purposes but that use
of the canal thereafter for access to recreational waters was not. In State v.
Olinkraft, Inc., 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court announced that a timely
motion to dismiss would properly put in issue whether the taking was not
only for a public purpose but also for a highway purpose. The court further
held, however, that an allegation of lack of public purpose in a taking in
full ownership, as distinguished from a servitude, did not relate to purpose
but only to necessity and that such an issue would not be considered on
judicial review except for the purpose of determining whether the expro-
priating agency acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in deciding that the taking
was necessary. Finding a rational basis for the decision and an absence of
bad faith, the court refused to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.' The result of these holdings is to require the state to make a
showing that a taking is not merely for a public purpose but specifically for
a highway purpose under the language of both the 1921 and 1974 constitu-
tions and the enabling legislation thereunder. 9 The further result is to
modify the decision in State v. Guidry,"0 which precluded review of the
issue of necessity of a taking for highway purposes, so as to provide for
judicial review of that issue, when timely raised on a motion to dismiss, to
the extent of determining "whether the expropriating agency acted arbi-
trarily, capriciously, or in bad faith in determining the necessity of the
taking ...
THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST TAKEN
The extent of the interest taken for an airspace servitude and the
resulting remaining rights of the expropriatee came up in a context which
is increasingly commonplace as airspace takings become necessary around
6. Id. at 863.
7. 350 So. 2d 865 (La. 1977).
8. Id. at 874-75.
9. La. Const. of 1921, art. VI, § 19.1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2, as implemented
by LA. R.S.. 48:446, 460 (Supp. 1975).
10. 240 La. 516, 124 So. 2d 531 (1960).
11. State.v. Olinkraft, Inc., 350 So. 2d 865, 873 (La. 1977).
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burgeoning airports. In Greater Baton Rouge Airport District v. Hays,12
the court had to decide whether an avigation servitude or a clear zone
servitude was being taken in order to appraise the adequacy of the award.
The court's decision that the taking involved an avigation servitude meant
a greater award and greater severance damage since the remaining uses of
the property are thereby limited by more extensive building restrictions. 13
EXPROPRIATION v. EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
Drawing the line between an exercise of the police power and an
expropriation continues to be troublesome. In Arkansas-Louisiana Gas
Co. v. City of Minden, 4 for example, the court held that requiring a utility
servitude owner to lower a pipeline, so that a natural drain could be
deepened, was an expropriation rather than a mere exercise of the police
power and required compensation to be paid. The action required by the
city, the court noted, was not taken because the utility's pipeline
constituted a menace or hazard to the public safety but was required in the
course of fulfilling a duty by the city to clear and improve a natural drain.
To bring the requirement of such action within an exercise of the police
power would be "to extend . . . a potentially dangerous power beyond
the limits of reason and the necessities of public purpose."I 5 On the other
hand, in Skye Realty Co. v. State,'6 where the abutting owner had been
occupying an existing unused right of way for parking and access to other
parking, the damage suffered when such right of way was fully utilized by
the state was non-compensable as not a "taking" but an exercise of the
police power. 17 Nor was the damage compensable independent of a taking
since the injury to the owner was suffered in common with all other
owners along the widened street and was not special or peculiar to his
property. 18
DAMAGES
The principle of offset to severance damages for benefits stemming
from an improvement is subject to limitations as to the character of such
benefits. To be offset, such benefits must inure exclusively to a property
12. 339 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
13. Id. at 434, 437-40.
14. 341 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
15. Id. at 609.
16. 345 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
17. Id. at 252.
18. See also Reymond v. State, 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375 (1970).
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or properties. The benefits must, in other words, be special to particular
properties and not shared generally by the community.1 9 Thus a remainder
tract so situated after the taking as to have a unique or peculiar advantage
from the new interchange would enjoy a special benefit whereas the
convenience enjoyed by the neighborhood in having an interstate entrance
nearby would affect all values and would be a general benefit. 20 The
distinction was applied by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Wells21 in disallowing an offset of value increase urged as special where
evidence established the increase was one common to all property in the
vicinity. 22 Wells also provides an authoritative statement as to the legisla-
tive intent of the provision in the highway quick-taking statute that allows
severance damages to be determined at trial which must be held within a
year from notification of acceptance of the project. 23 This provision, the
court notes, was not intended to move the general valuation date to the
time of trial but only "to specify . . . that the damages the remainder
suffers should be reduced by special benefits which result to it from the
completion of the highway construction .... .- 24 This advantage to the
state cannot be insured, however, since the remainder owner is free to
litigate the issue of severance damages at the time of taking. State v.
Regent Development Corp.2 5 illustrated this recently when severance
damage was allowed without offset of special benefits because the benefits
were "speculative, conjectural, and uncertain as of the date of trial." '26
Such speculation was enhanced in Regent since the expropriation was
characterized as an "advance taking" with the construction not yet ap-
proved and litigation to stop the project pending.27 Special benefits, when
urged by the state, must now be specially pleaded. 28
19. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LouISIANA 86-87 (1970).
20. Id.
21. 308 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975).
22. Id. at 776.
23. LA. R.S. 48:451(1) (1950).
24. 308 So. 2d at 776. In 1974 the language of the statute was amended to make
this meaning clearer. LA. R.S. 48:453 (Supp. 1974) now reads: "The measure of
damages, if any, to the defendant's remaining property is determined on a basis of
immediately before and immediately after the taking, taking into consideration the
effects of the completion of the project in the manner proposed or planned." See
also Comment, Expropriation by Ex Parte Order for Highway Purposes in Louisi-
ana, 26 LA. L. REV. 91, 102-03 (1965).
25. 344 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 51.
28. LA. R.S. 48:456.1 (Supp. 1974).
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Special benefits are subject to the further limitation that they be offset
only against severance damages and not against the award for land taken.
Considered in combination with the "front land-rear land" rule developed
primarily in connection with highway widening projects, the results have
not been happy for a highway department concerned with husbanding its
resources. 29 Thus a remainder left after a taking may front on a four-lane
highway and hence be so valuable that severance damages are out of the
question, nothing against which to offset special benefits usually being
present. In this posture of the case, the state has attempted to use an
"average value" for the land taken rather than its commercial frontage
value which may be considerably higher. The state hopes to minimize
damage to the public fisc stemming from the fact that no offset is permitt-
ed against the award for special benefits conferred on the remainder which
has become commercial frontage. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has now definitively rejected this approach in State v. Hoyt, 30 stating:
The landowner is . . . to be awarded the actual market value of the
particular portion of the property taken, valued according to its
highest and best use. He is not limited to its average per-acre value as
a pro rata portion of the parent tract where the front portion has a
different and higher best-use value. 31
The owner may thus achieve, as he did in State v. Westport Development
Co. 32 the eminently satisfactory result of being compensated for commer-
cial land taken while enjoying a metamorphosis of the remainder into the
same high value commercial frontage. There is apparently no legislative
disposition to temper this rule. A recent enactment, albeit unintentionally,
actually worked a further detriment to the highway department's attempts
at husbandry. In the 1974 amendments to the quick-taking statute there
was included a provision for the award of attorney's fees where the court
award is more than the amount deposited by the state in the registry of the
court. 33 In State v. Johnson,34 the state continued its tenacious resistance
to the "front land-rear land" valuation rule, ignoring appellate court
holdings and only increasing its deposit under the threat of Hoyt. The trial
judge nonetheless refused to grant attorney's fees as prayed for under the
29. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 19, at 88.
30. 284 So. 2d 763 (La. 1973).
31. Id. at 764.
32. 332 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
33. LA. R.S. 48:453(E) (Supp. 1974).
34. 341 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
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new provision. The appellate court whose holdings in the matter had not
been followed characterized the action of a trial court judge as an abuse of
discretion subject to reversal; the result to the state was payment of the
higher value for the land taken plus payment of attorney's fees for
engendering pointless litigation.
35
In State v. Advance Enterprises,36 the court followed State v. Den-
ham Springs Development Co. ,3 refusing to distinguish between loss of
developed parking area and loss of area available for development, since
in each case damage results to the shopping center in the form of inability
to supply parking space at the recommended rate of three square feet for
each square foot of building space. Damages were calculated by determin-
ing the percentage loss in parking space and applying that percentage to
the depreciated value of the shopping center. 38 Against severance damages
awarded a credit was given for the cost of developing the parking space
taken.39
In Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Girouard,4° additional status
was achieved for crawfish as a crop for which there must be compensation
if damaged in a taking of servitude for right of way. The highest and best
use of the land was rural homesite and agriculture and the crawfish ponds
involved were dealt with as part of an agricultural enterprise, it being
noted that they were a supplementary crop for rice growers. Severance
damage for the crop was based on estimates of per acre harvest and current
market price per pound. That amount was reduced, however, for the
failure of the owner, without satisfactory explanation, to mitigate his crop
loss by repairing levees and reflooding ponds after the taking. 41 The
crawfish specialists called to testify were accorded expert fees since their
expertise was "of some value to the court."-
42
Last year it was noted in the pages of this Review 43 that the legisla-
35. Id. at 16.
36. 332 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
37. State v. Denham Springs Dev. Co., 307 So. 2d 304 (La. 1975).
38. 332 So. 2d at 902-03. Compare the method used in Denham Springs of
calculating the loss in income from loss of parking space and reducing such loss to
present value. 307 So. 2d at 306-07.
39. 332 So. 2d at 905.
40. 336 So. 2d 1042 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 1044-45.
42. Id. at 1048-49.
43. The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-
Expropriation, 37 LA. L. REV. 147 (1976).
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ture had codified the St. Julien rule of estoppel" in response to a judicial
decision excluding electric transmission line right of way from classifica-
tion as a continuous and apparent servitude which could be acquired by
unopposed use or possession.45 In State v. Thurston,46 in a taking for
highway widening, the state was unopposed in its position that a servitude
had been established in the paved surface of a rural highway. However, it
was unsuccessful in an attempt to prove that the shoulders and ditches had
also been acquired under the St. Julien rule and need not be compensated
for in the second taking for the purpose of widening the existing highway.
The court found no proof of construction or dominion over these areas
"which would have clearly indicated to the landowner at that time the
dimensions of the land area which the department intended to occupy for a
public purpose.-"'
In Thurston the issue was raised in the answer of the landowner by
contesting the amount of land taken. In State v. Boss,48 however, the issue
was raised only in the process of taking evidence without amendment of
pleadings. The trial court was reversed in making an award which
compensated the owner for more than the land sought to be taken in the
expropriation judgment on the basis of non-compliance with the St. Julien
rule, even though the recorded right of way showed no servitude beyond
the paved surface of the road, and there was no evidence of dominion by
the state over the shoulder area.4 9
VALUATION
In Reddel v. State,50 another variant of valuation time in inadvertent
takings was announced. It is a well-established rule that where there is full
knowledge of the expropriation at the time of the taking, as there was in
A.K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 5' the date of valuation will be
fixed at the date of the actual taking. Where there is no actual knowledge
at the time of the taking, and where ownership is asserted promptly upon
the acquisition of such knowledge, the date of valuation will be the date of
44. LA. R.S. 19:14 (1950). See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 19, at 40,
164-65.
45. Lake v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 330 So. 2d 914 (La. 1976).
46. 338 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
47. Id. at 156.
48. 335 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
49. Id. at 702.
50. 340 So. 2d 1010 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
51. See A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 238 La. 926, 117 So. 2d 60
(1960).
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formal expropriation, deemed in Koerber v. City of New Orleans5 2 to be
the date on which the expropriator filed an answer acknowledging expro-
priation in the owner's suit for compensation. In Reddel the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal held that where there is no full knowledge at the time of
taking, but where there is an unexplained delay in asserting ownership
after knowledge, the time of valuation will be fixed at the date the
expropriatee acquired such knowledge. 3 In a period of burgeoning land
prices the owner in Reddel understandably argued for the later valuation
date of Koerber rather than the earlier date of Roy. However, the date of
acquiring knowledge of the taking is probably equitable in the circum-
stances since it makes unprofitable a deliberate delay in suing for compen-
sation in order to take advantage of a higher valuation date.
Where the question of damages to remainders is also involved in an
illegal taking, a plea of prescription may arise and the point of time from
which prescription will run must be determined. In Greater Baton Rouge
Airport District v. Hays, prescription was urged in a suit for damages
but rejected; since only damages from the taking were being sought and
since the legal taking occurred, and prescription began, under the general
expropriation act, only upon judgment rendered,"5 there could be no
prescription incurred in connection therewith even through the actual
taking occurred earlier.5 6
Despite the fact that the jurisprudence has been clear for many years
that a highest and best use created by the suitability of land for taker's
purposes cannot serve as a basis of valuation, 57 arguments for the use of
such a basis continue to surface from time to time. Thus in Louisiana
Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Edwards,58 it was urged successfully in the trial
court that the highest and best use of the rural land over which a pipeline
right of way was sought was precisely that for which it was being taken.59
The appellate court reduced the award of $5000 per acre for "pipeline
servitudes" to $1000 per acre for rural farm land. 60
52. See Koerber v. City of New Orleans, 228 La. 903, 84 So. 2d 454 (1955).
53. 340 So. 2d at 1016.
54. 339 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
55. LA. R.S. 19:2.1(B) (Supp. 1974). See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 19,
at 349-50.
56. 339 So. 2d at 435-36.
57. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 19, at 178-79.
58. 343 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
59. Id. at 1167.
60. Id. at 1168.
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In the valuation process, the role of post-taking comparable sales
remains uncertain despite the fact that they may often be sound gauges of
value for the purposes of litigation. The court will use such comparables
only in a restricted way as, for example, in State v. Guste6' and State v.
DeRouen62 where such sales were admitted for the purpose of showing
market trends. In State v. Rosenblum,63 however, an attempt to use post-
taking comparables to determine directly the market value of expropriated
property was rejected.' 4 On the other hand, where the problem is one of
assessing the magnitude of severance damages as reduced by special
benefits as of the time of trial, pursuant to the quick-taking provision
which allows the procedure, it seems apparent that post-taking compara-
bles can play a more important role. In State v. Romano,65 involving only
severance damages, the court noted that "[i]t is only the value of the
property, in its affected state, that is allowed to fluctuate pursuant to the
vicissitudes of the market until that amount is determined as of the time of
trial. "I Thus the court amended the trial court judgment to award
severance damages based on the difference between the value immediately
before the taking and the value at time of trial, taking into account the
damage due to lack of access after the taking.67 Comparable sales of land-
locked property were relied upon to fix such value;68 these might plausibly
have been post-taking comparables so long as they were used to establish
the effect of land-locking and not other market changes since the date of
taking.
The care which must be devoted to use of the income capitalization
method of valuation was illustrated in State v. Ponder,6 9 involving ex-
propriation of allegedly exploitable sand and gravel tracts. The evidence
of income which the tracts would produce consisted of testimony concern-
ing royalties produced by another ongoing operation, without relating such
testimony to the subject tract's income-producing potential. The value per
acre said by the trial court to be based on an income approach was thus
rejected as a mere guess; instead, the court used comparable sales data.7"
61. 319 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
62. 228 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
63. 344 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 425-26.
65. 343 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 228.
67. Id. at 227-28.
68. Id. at 227.
69. 345 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
70. Id. at 110-11.
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State v. Crow,7 1 which the trial court cited to buttress its holding, ap-
proved the income approach as one of the tools of evaluation, but in that
case there was in fact a thoroughgoing development of value on an income
basis, utilizing it in conjunction with a cost approach and comparable
sales. The criticism to be leveled at the Crow case is neglect of the
appraisal "buy or build" principle which would, except in unusual cir-
cumstances, require rejection of an income capitalization value substan-
tially exceeding depreciated replacement cost new, since an informed
buyer would normally reject such a capitalized income price in favor of
construction of his own project. 72
Another vulnerability of the income approach lies in the factors used
to construct the estimate of capitalized value. Although the appropri-
ateness of the rate of return and depreciation rates selected are essential to
its persuasiveness, courts often give them only the offhand treatment that
is illustrated by Crow. The factors used are also crucial in arriving at the
discounted present value of a lease advantage such as was involved in
State v. Hayward,73 since variations in the interest rate used or in the rent
to be reserved in lease renewals may make very substantial differences in
lessee awards. Hayward recognized as essential the discounting of a lease
advantage; such discounting has not been uniformly required, 74 although
in the most frequently cited case, State v. Cockerham,71 the award to the
lessee was the discounted present value of the advantage to be realized by
the lessee over the life of the lease. 76
PROCEDURE
Expert Witness Fees
Perhaps the most frequent procedural point to reach appellate con-
sideration is the magnitude and character of expert fees to be taxed as costs
to the expropriator.
Obviously, fees of real estate appraisers are the most commonplace
and hence most frequently questioned. The hallmark of legitimacy is that
all expert services must aid the court in the disposition of the case.77
71. 286 So. 2d 353 (La. 1973).
72. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 19, at 240.
73. 338 So. 2d 1171 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
74. See, e.g., State v. Thornton, 220 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
75. 182 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
76. Id. at 801.
77. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 332 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), and cases
cited therein.
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Hence, an item submitted with great frequency in recent highway takings
has been the fees of photographers, but the courts have with almost equal
frequency refused such fees as costs since they are rarely of aid to the
court. 78 In State v. Kornman,7 9 another somewhat novel kind of expertise,
that of the stone and marble mason, was successfully taxed as a cost
because it was in the nature of expert advice to the court. A faint cry of sic
transit gloria might have been raised here for the appraisal at issue was the
worth of a native stone gateway marking the original entrance to the now
subdivided Shushan Estate. The cost of workmanship of the gateway was
duly appraised by the expert, but since it had no resale value even for
momento purposes because of its size and since it added only aesthetic
appeal for the owners of the lots, its destruction was allowed to go
uncompensated, no erosion in the pecuniary position of the owners being
deemed to result therefrom .80
Recovery of expert witness fees as costs is also limited when the suit
is not one for just compensation, even though based on the absence of just
compensation. In Alexander v. State, 81 while the owner was successful in
rescinding a voluntary sale to the state on the ground of lesion beyond
moiety, expert fees were not taxed as costs to the state since the suit was
viewed as an ordinary contract claim which permitted only the taxing of
the landowner's share of the stenographic costs. 82
Only when there has been no tender of the true value of the property
may expert fees be taxed as costs. 83 In South Central Bell Telephone Co.
v. Marsh Investment Corp. 84 the court rejected a letter offer as an inade-
quate tender because the company did not thereby unconditionally submit
the true value prior to filing suit.85 The court suggested such an expro-
priator might meet the requisites of the statute by following the procedure
for tender under the quick-taking statute: a deposit in the registry of the
court which may be drawn down by the expropriatee and is thus "uncondi-
tionally submitted" to the owner by the state.86 In Louisiana Resources
Co. v. Fiske,87 it was noted that generally costs consisting of expert fees
78. Id. at 924.
79. 336 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
80. Id. at 226-27.
81. 342 So. 2d 1201 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 1205.
83. LA. R.S. 19:12 (1950).
84. 344 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 7-8.
86. Id.
87. 343 So. 2d 1219 (La. App 3d Cir. 1977).
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are incidental to the main demand, charged along with compensation and
damages in a decree prior to judgment and hence appealable only in
conjunction with such judgment. The court also held, however, that where
expert fees are taken under advisement and taxed in a separate judgment
subsequent to judgment on the merits, such judgment is separately appeal-
able providing notice and order of appeal are timely made from the entry
thereof."8
Administration of Relocation Assistance Benefits
The adoption in 1971 of a Relocation Assistance Act administered by
the Department of Highways may inject administrative law concepts into
an otherwise judicially administered expropriation scheme.8 9 Since the act
provides no additional funds for-relocation, assistance is to be granted in
the discretion of the agency and is to be deemed a gratuity, not compensa-
tion for any additional element of value.' As a way of husbanding its
funds against this additional cost, a department regulation imposes a
condition on its recipients: in the event they seek judicial increase of an
offer for property, any assistance benefits granted will be credited against
such judicial increase over the amount offered by the Department and
deposited in the registry of the court.9" Nonetheless, in Bounds v. State,9 2
the landowner sought to litigate separately the issue of his entitlement to
relocation assistance benefits. On appeal it was held that such a suit was
premature since an assistance award or the denial of it is made subject to
administrative review under authority delegated by the statute.9 3 The suit
was dismissed without prejudice to allow exhaustion of administrative
remedies although the court would seem to have precedent for passing
upon the clear question of law presented as to whether the condition
imposed in the regulations was within the grant of power to the depart-
ment. 94
88. Id. at 1221.
89. LA. R.S. 38:3101-3109 (Supp. 1971).
90. Id. 38:3108.
91. Bounds v. State, 333 So. 2d 714, 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
92. 333 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
93. Id. at 717.
94. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
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